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Saturday, 16 April 2011

Why the US "password revolution" won't work

Posted on 05:29 by Unknown
So, I've been reading this article this morning on how the US "private and public" institutions are going to revolutionize the way we authenticate on the web. The "ground breaking" idea, also illustrated on this NIST animation, is to use 3rd party authorities that would first verify your identity somehow ("Can we see your id?", "What is your Mam's maiden name?", etc), and then would issue you some kind of a token that you would later use for authentication on the web. A token would be e.g. a smart card, or a USB stick (probably they just mean a smart card with USB connector, whatever), or even a "phone application".

The idea is that the user will not have to "remember" all those passwords for all the various websites, which apparently is a problem in practice, because most users never heard about password manager apps, and so they actually try to remember all those passwords, or even try to use the same one all over the place. Using one password for more than one website is obviously wrong and people should be told not to do that. But an easy way to solve this is to just get people to use password managers.

But the key problem that they try to solve, which is identity theft, is just not gonna be solved by this "password revolution". This is because if somebody has compromised my laptop, then it really doesn't matter if I use passwords, or smart cards, or whatever other multi-factor authentication mechanism -- none of them will help if the attacker controls my operating system.

Most people cannot just get it -- this is because they lack understanding of how computers and operating systems work. They don't understand that the operating system can impersonate the user at will! This is because the operating system fully controls the keyboard, the mouse, and the screen.

So, imagine you use your super-secure smart card token for authentication to your bank. So, before you log into your bank account, and perhaps before you make any transaction on the banking website, you must insert your smart card somewhere (e.g. into smart card reader, or into USB port, etc). Before you insert your token, no one can impersonate you on the bank website. So far, so good! But then, once you inserted your token, it's all lost! The compromised OS could have saved your PIN to this card when you used it previously (even if you configured it not to do so!) and now,  immediately, it could use the inserted card to authenticate as you to the bank and start issuing transactions on your behalf. And you won't even notice this all, because in the meantime it will show you a faked screen of your banking account. After all, it fully controls the screen.

The bottom line is that we cannot secure our digital lives, if our client operating systems could not be secured first. And today, the operating systems we use on our laptops, such as Windows, or Mac, or Ubuntu, are just trivial to be compromised by the attackers. After all, if that wasn't true we wouldn't have all those problems with identity theft. But introduction of tokens won't make our operating systems any more secure!

What we need instead are technologies that allow to build next-generation trusted operating systems. Technologies such as Intel TXT or VT-d. And we need OS vendors to actually start using them.

You can say I'm biased, because of our work on Qubes OS. But then, consider this -- perhaps we would never invest so much money and resources into this project, if we believed there are other ways to bring security to our digital life.
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